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ABSTRACT In an industrial system, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are usually adapted to industrial
applications. Industrial system is a novel scenario to apply WSNs. Industrial WSNs are the base to establish
a supervisory control and data acquisition system with the benefits of extending the network boundaries and
enhancing the network scalability of the WSNs. The integration of industrial systems, such as smart grids
and social networks, is an important trend for new network technologies. In many application scenarios of
industrial systems, WSNs are controlled by different authorities. The network nodes that belong to different
domains can share the sensor data by standard protocols. Moreover, in an applications, scenario that has high
security requirements, the nodes of social networking WSNs could belong to different security levels; thus,
these data can be controlled only by specific types of users. Therefore, the cross-domain fine-grained data
usage is the core problem for this approach. To address this problem, this paper focuses on the cross-domain
fine-grained data usage control mechanism of social networkingWSNs in industrial systems, which includes
cross-domain fine-grained access control and fuzzy clustering for sensing data for efficient analysis.
In addition, dynamic service composition is proposed for data usage. The simulation results verify the
feasibility and data usage effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
INDEX TERMS Usage control, cross-domain, fine-grained, wireless sensor networks (WSNs), clusters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because a large amount of sensing data from industrial sys-
tems is stored in industrial wireless sensor networks (WSNs),
data security naturally becomes an important concern. In fact,
in many applications scenarios of industrial systems, data
sensed by industrial WSNs are closely related to security
and safety issues [1]–[3]. More specifically, the sensing data
should be controlled by only authorized users of the industrial
system.
Currently, industrial WSNs have attracted a large amount
of attention, which allows the interconnection of smart
objects, such as mobile robots and wireless sensors, by
using different communication protocols and by developing
a dynamic multi-modal heterogeneous network. Recently,
WSNs have been applied widely in industry and have
greatly improved the informatization and automation of these
areas [4]. With the development of WSN technologies, the
integration of WSNs and social networks is an important
trend of new network technologies; this approach can estab-
lish social relationships in an autonomous way with the bene-
fits of extending network boundaries and enhancing network
scalability. In this new system, the nodes in WSNs can obtain
social attributes and capabilities and become an important
part of social networks. There are many advantages for using
the attributes and ideas of social networking elements in
the WSNs in industrial systems. This approach allows the
nodes in industrial sensors to establish social relationships
autonomously. More importantly, the nodes in social WSNs
can act as the core nodes of social networks, which establishes
a bridge between the social users and the physical world.
Also, some complex and novel network model, such as
social networking, for industrial systems has been studied
widely, especially with respect to smart grids. A more robust
framework is proposed in [5] for exploring the diffusion of
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basic smart grid technologies using a social network-based
model to study demand response adoption in smart grids.
In [6], a ‘‘family plan’’ approach was proposed that partitions
users into groups and schedules the users’ appliances to min-
imize the peak power consumption of each group in the smart
grid. In addition, social networking WSNs have been studied
widely. Reference [7] gave a definition and basic function
model of a combination of social WSNs, and the benefits of
this system have been widely discussed [8], [9]. Additionally,
social networking WSNs have been studied extensively.
Reference [10] focused on the problem of understanding
how the information provided by members of the social
networking WSN must be processed to build a reliable sys-
tem on the basis of the behavior of objects. Some typi-
cal applications schemes based on social networking WSNs
have also been proposed, such as context awareness and
the service architecture for Body Sensor Networks (BSNs)
in social networks [11], [12]. On the other hand, the real
application systems of the social networkingWSNs are under
research. For example, under the support of the European-
funded project, the ‘‘SMART Cities Search Engine’’ has
been proposed. In this project, the sensors in the Internet
of Things (IoT) in a city can be integrated with Twitter;
thus, the users in social networks can interoperate the data
from the underlying sensors, which can optimize the security,
transportation, and other components of a smart city. This
project has been tested in a real city in 2014 [13].
Although the novel networking models for industrial
WSNs have many additional benefits compared with tradi-
tional WSNs in industrial systems, the openness, complexity
and dynamics of social networks increase the risks. In recent
industrial WSNs, almost all of the sensors and base stations
belong to a single authority who can master the whole net-
work. In this situation, we call it a single domain sensor
network. However, inmany applications scenarios, social net-
working WSNs are controlled by different authorities. Addi-
tionally, the network nodes that belong to different domains
can share sensor data by standard protocols. How to realize
the cross-domain security access for multi-domain WSNs is
a research question that must be resolved. Moreover, in an
applications scenario that has higher security requirements,
all types of sensing data generated based on various nodes
of social networking WSNs could have different levels of
security. Thus, these data could be controlled only by given
types of users. In other words, the usage rights of a given type
of data for users are based solely on necessity. For example,
the monitoring center in the smart grid scenario must be able
to access all types of data for it to have overall control of the
system. On the other hand, an operator could need to access
only the sensing data that is relevant to his work. However,
most of the existing proposals for security schemes for sens-
ing data in WSNs have been proposed to perform uniform
security. Therefore, fine-grained data control is a necessity.
To address the above challenges, this paper proposes a
security fine-grained cross-domain data usage mechanism
for WSNs. Section II presents the preliminaries of this paper.
Sect. III gives the design principles. Sect. IV gives the pro-
posed cross-domain secure authentication. Sect. V gives the
fuzzy cluster data analysis scheme. The implementation sys-
tem and evaluation are presented in Sect VI. Related studies
are given in Sect. VII. Finally, Sect. VIII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. CROSS-DOMAIN DATA STORAGE AND
ACCESS ARCHITECTURE
There are two main methods for WSNs to perform data stor-
age and usage, which are centralized and distributedmethods.
For the centralized method, the data are sensed based on
individual sensor nodes and return to a central node. For the
distributed method, after the data are sensed by a sensor node,
the sensor stores the data by itself or in some related nodes.
Thus, the WSNs do not need to send the sensing data to a
centralized node. In addition, the stored sensing data can be
controlled by the users of the WSN. The cross-domain data
storage and access architecture is shown in Fig. 1.
FIGURE 1. Cross-domain data storage and access.
B. BASIC TECHNOLOGIES
1) PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI)
In cryptography, the public key infrastructure (PKI) is a
system that combines public keys and given user identities
through using a certificate authority (CA). In fact, PKI is a
system that has a set of software, hardware, users, and poli-
cies, which can create, distribute, store, use, and revoke the
digital certificates. The identity of the users should be unique
in the domain of each CA. In addition, this information can
be provided by the third-party validation authority (VA) on
behalf of the CA. The combination process is performed
through issuance and registration. The issuance depends on
the assurance level of the combination and can be performed
by the software of a CA. The registration authority (RA) is
used to denote the role of the PKI that assures this combi-
nation. This approach can ensure that the public key corre-
sponds to the user. PKI provides a high security level for the
information system.
2) ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a useful access control
method that was developed in the 1990s. The RBAC 96
method proposed by Sandhuat George Mason Univer-
sity became a classical role-based access control method
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later. As a secure and efficient access control mechanism,
RBAC was widely applied because of its introduction of
the concept role, which makes it convenient to allocate and
manage permissions. Users acquire corresponding permis-
sion through roles, whereby operation permission is granted
to the roles rather than to the users themselves. When a
user’s permission changed, the user’s current role takes the
place of the original role. RBAC has characteristics such as
a hierarchy role, minimum privilege and separation of duty.
The basic RBAC method defined the most essential elements
as follows: user, role, object, operation and permission, which
also includes user assignment, permission assignment and
session. With those elements, this method makes it possible
to allocate and manage permissions efficiently.
3) USAGE CONTROL (UCON)
Usage control (UCON) is regarded as the next generation
access control model. In contrast to traditional access control,
it performs data control not only at the time of access but
also during and after the usage [14]. Continuous decisions
with regard to data usage could be performed before the
usage is allowed or during the process of the usage session,
with an event after the session. Additionally, the attributes
can be updated before, in the process of or after the usage
has been authorized. Through this type of continuous control
of the data usage, the security level can be substantially
improved. Some additional capabilities, such as data rights
management, can be performed. In the relationship between
traditional access control and usage control, the authenti-
cation process is a basic component of the usage control.
The continuous access decisions are made based on the
attributes and access policies. The authentication process can
provide some primitive attributes that support pre-decisions.
However, further ongoing decisions are based on many other
dynamic attributes of subjects and objects. The definition of
usage control is shown in Fig. 2.
FIGURE 2. Usage control definition.
4) FUZZY CLUSTER
Cluster analysis is a type of multivariate analysis in math-
ematical statistics. However, because in the real world the
classification always has the features of fuzzy, fuzzy clus-
tering is the most appropriate to perform the classification
and makes the classification results conform more to reality.
The basic idea of fuzzy clustering is shown as follows. For
a given sample set, the proper formulas are used to compute
the similarity factors of different samples. Then, the fuzzy
similarity relation can be achieved. Next, the similarity rela-
tions are changed to fuzzy equivalent relationships. Finally,
the samples can be classified by the given rules.
III. DESIGN PRINCIPLE
A cross-domain fine-grained data usage control service is
proposed to enhance the security of WSNs in industrial sys-
tems. A comprehensive set based on a data usage control
Service Bus is utilized in the proposed mechanism, as shown
in Fig. 3. In addition to the original Applications (APPs),
Business ActivityMonitoring (BAM), Rules and Tasks, secu-
rity service protects the data with Service Manager and Ser-
vice Composition. Security management toward DR events
relies on the two security services, which include a cross-
domain fine-grained data access service (CUS) and a data
analysis service (DAS). Service Manager provides the cen-
tralized management of the original service and additional
security services such as versioned, private and public ser-
vice types in the sensor networks in the industrial systems.
Service Manager includes a Service Registry and a Service
Repository, which enable the versioning and reuse of service
types, and a Service Dispatcher provides a publish/subscribe
communication framework.
FIGURE 3. Proposed security service mechanism for WSNs data.
The three major security services are provided to protect
the system that is achieved by the fine-grained sub-services
under the dispatch of the service manager, service compo-
sition and service selection, as shown in Fig. 4. Consider-
ing the security and efficiency requirements of the proposed
mechanism, the sensing data storage service includes data
FIGURE 4. Basic idea of the proposed security service.
sensing and combination capabilities. Security access service
toward the sensing side probes the security-related data from
the industrial sensors. Based on the certificate assignment
method of X.509 (according to ISO/IEC 9594-8), the system
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integrates the characteristics ofWSNs. A username/password
security token is used to perform the use login protocol.
An access control method is utilized to allocate permission
based on the probed data. The username/password token with
the help of a dynamic password provides a more secure
authentication. In addition, sensing data analysis services can
perform the fine-grained data analysis.
IV. CROSS-DOMAIN SECURE ACCESS SCHEME
In the application, we can regard a domain as a network that
belongs to a single authority. In addition, the security require-
ments are relatively low. The number of users is relatively
limited, and the authentication in the domain is relatively
simple. Hence, symmetric key cryptography (SKC) is suffi-
cient for the secure authentication of single-domain WSNs,
as in our previous work. However, secure authentication for
a cross-domain is very complex, and public key cryptog-
raphy (PKC) combined with SKC is needed to resolve the
question. The notation used in this section is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Notations used in the proposed scheme.
A. TRUST MODEL FOR CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY (CA)
Based on the certificate assignmentmethod of X.509 (accord-
ing to ISO/IEC 9594-8), integratingwith the characteristics of
WSNs, we propose the trust model for authority in industrial
WSNs.
The framework is a multilayer tree structure in a domain.
Moreover, it is a mesh structure among the domains. Each
greyer certificate authority (CA) is a root CA because a trust
anchors in a domain. For the WSNs that have distributed data
storage, we use a two-layer tree structure, such as Domain1.
The top layer CA1 is designed in the base station to be the root
CA and can issue data certificates and distribute keys to the
second-layer CA, such as CA11. In addition, the CAs at the
second layer are designed in the nodes in which the sensed
data are stored. These CAs can issue data certificates and
distributed keys to the data servers and users. In our scheme,
the data server is also in the nodes in which the data are stored.
For the WSNs with centralized data storage, we use only a
single-layer structure, such as Domain 2. In the root CA, CA2
is designed into the base station or the single sink. CA2 can
issue data certificates and distributed keys to the data servers
and users. In addition, the server is in the node in which the
data are stored, which is the base station or sink.
B. LOGIN PROTOCOL FOR THE USER
Next, we define some notation that is used in the secure
authentication and key distribution protocol.
In our scheme, the user login to the WSN is based on a
password. The user will log into the WSN when she needs to
access the data. Then, the user will begin the login protocol.
The login protocol is described as follows:
Step 1: U → AS : {IDU ,P,RN1}PKAS
When userU logs into a domain of theWSN, she generates
a random value RN1 and then encrypts P, IDU and RN1. Next,
the user sends the ciphertext to the access server (AS), such
as the base station or sink or sensor, which stores the data.
Step 2: AS → U : {RN2, IDU }RN1
After AS receives the request message from U , she
decrypts the message by her private key SKAS; then, she
obtains the IDU and P and authenticates the identity of U .
After the identity authentication,AS generates a random value
RN2; then, she encrypts RN2 and IDU by the symmetric key
RN1; next, she sends the ciphertext to U .
Step 3:AfterU receives the ciphertext from AS and subse-
quently decrypts the ciphertext by RN1, she then obtains the
RN2 as the session key for the access from U to AS.
C. CROSS-DOMAIN SECURE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Step 1:
U → ASh : IDU , {IDS ,NU ,TU ,RU , h(TU ,RU )}KU ,AS
U sends an access request to the ASh in her domain to ask
access to the server S in another domain. NU in the access
request is the random value generated by U to ensure that
the request is fresh. TU and RU are the additional elements to
resist against the reply attack.
Step 2: ASh→ ASv : IDASh , Shv
ASh decrypts the message from Uand then checks which
domain ASh belongs to by IDS. Then, ASh generates the
random value Nhv and computes Shv = αNhv mod P.
Step 3: ASv→ ASh : Svh,
{
Cert.ASv, {h(Svh, Shv)}SKv
}
Kvh
ASh generates a random Nvh and, then, computes Svh =
αNvh mod P (according to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
scheme, which is Kvh = Khv = SNhvvh mod P = SNvhhv mod P).
Here, Kvh acts as the temporary session key between ASv
and ASh. ASv decrypts her public key certificate chain and
the digital signature of h(Svh, Shv) by Kvh. Then, ASv sends
the ciphertext and Svh to ASh.
Step 4:
ASh→ ASv :
{
Cert.ASh, {h(Shv, Svh)}SKh , IDU , IDS ,
sk,TU ,RU , h(TU ,RU ), {IDU , sk}NU
}
Khv
After ASh receives the message from ASv, ASh computes
Khv and Kvh based on the method of Step 3 according to Svh.
Thus, ASh obtains the certificate chain of ASv and the digital
signature to verify the identity. After verification, ASh sends
ASv amessage that is encrypted byKhv. Themessage includes
the certificate chain of ASh, the digital signature, identity
information of U and S, the random value sk as the session
key between U and S, and the ticket {IDU , sk}NU .
When an AS verifies the intra-domain certificate chain of
another access server, she looks for the CA that can be trusted
and can implement cross-authentication with the root CA of
the intra-domain certificate chain. Then, a trust chain can be
established, and AS can use the public key of the root CA of
the intra-domain to verify the certificate chain.
Step 5:
ASv→ S :
{
IDU , IDS , sk,TU ,RU , {IDU , sk}NU ,Nv
}
KS,AS
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FIGURE 5. Role-based usage control for access.
ASv verifies the identity of ASh based on the method in
Step 4 and then sends S the identity of U and S, sk, ticket
{IDU , sk}NU and the random value for fresh. All of the data
are encrypted by KS,AS .
Step 6:
S → U : {IDU , sk}NU , {IDS ,TS ,RS , h(TS ,RS ),NS}sk
After S receives the message from ASV , she decrypts the
message by KS,AS . Then, she sends the ticket {IDU , sk}NU
to U ; at the same time, she encrypts her information by sk
and then sends it to U .
Step 7: U → S : NS + 1
After receiving the message from S, U decrypts
{IDU , sk}NU byNU . Then,U obtains the address of S through
decrypting the information of S by sk, and afterward,U sends
SNS + 1 as a response and verifies her identity to S. Last,
U accesses the data in S through the session key KU ,S .
D. CROSS-DOMAIN FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL
In our previous work [2], we presented the importance and
possibility of designing a usage control-based access scheme
for WSNs. In fact, the usage control is regarded as the
next generation access control abstract framework. Because
RBAC is simple for applications and flexible for extension, it
is promising that we realize usage control based on RBAC.
In the model, there are 5 control functions as follows: user
assignment, right assignment, authorization, obligations and
conditions. User assignment and right assignment are right
giving functions, and the other three functions are for right
removing.
We use a hierarchy role model for the cross-domain role
mapping. The model is based on inherited relations, which
means that the parent roles have all of the rights of the child
roles. The cross-domain role mapping is shown in Fig. 5.
The role ‘‘Vice administrator’’ in domain B is mapped to
the role ‘‘Advanced user’’ in domain B. This arrangement
means that if a user in domain B is assigned the role ‘‘Vice
administrator’’, she will have the rights of the role ‘‘Advanced
user’’ in domainAwhen she implements cross-domain access
FIGURE 6. Cross-domain role mapping.
to domain A. Moreover, role mapping can be transferred. For
example, in Fig. 6, when ‘‘Vice administrator’’ is mapped to
‘‘Advanced user’’ according to the hierarchy structure of role,
all of the parent roles of ‘‘Vice administrator’’ in domain B
are mapped to ‘‘Advanced user’’ in domain A.
V. SENSING DATA CLUSTERING ANALYSIS
With the development of the breadth and depth of monitoring
for the industrial system, it is very important to propose an
efficient method for analyzing the industrial sensing data.
Cluster analysis is a type of multivariate analysis in math-
ematical statistics. However, because in the real world, the
classification always has the feature of fuzzy, fuzzy clustering
is more appropriate when performing the classification, and
it makes the classification results conform more to reality.
We use graph theory to realize the data cluster [15], [16].
A. FUZZY EQUIVALENT RELATION
In classical mathematics, an equivalent relation is usually
used to classify the objects. Fuzzy cluster analysis is also
based on fuzzy equivalent relations.
Definition 1: Assume that X , Y are two nonempty sets
and the fuzzy subset of the following product sets is a fuzzy
relation between X and Y .
X × Y = {(x, y)∣∣x ∈ X , y ∈ Y}
The membership function of is F˜ .
µF˜ : X × Y → [0, 1]
For a given ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X×Y , µF˜ is the F˜ degree
of correlation of x and y, specifically when X = Y , F˜ is called
the fuzzy relation on X .
Definition 2:Assume that X , Y , Z are three nonempty sets,
and F˜1 is the fuzzy relation between X and Y , F˜2 is the fuzzy
relation between Y and Z , and F˜ is the fuzzy relation between
X and Z . For arbitrary (x, y) ∈ X × Y , the following formula
exists:
F˜ = ∨
y∈Y [F˜1(x, y) ∧ F˜2(y, z)]
where F˜ is a compositive relation between F˜1 and F˜2.
When X , Y , and Z are denoted as X = {x1, x2, · · · , xm},
and Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yl}, Z = {z1, z2, · · · , zn}, F˜1 =
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(fij) F˜2 = (fjk ), and F˜3 = (fik ) are an m × l, l × n, l × n
order fuzzy matrix. The following formula can be used:
fik = l∨
i=1(fij ∧ fjk ), (i = 1, 2, · · · , l; k = 1, 2, · · · , n)
More specifically, assume that F˜ is the fuzzy relation on X ,
and F˜2 = F˜ ◦ F˜ , and F˜2 is still the fuzzy relation on X . Then,
for arbitrary (x, z) = X × X , the following formula can be
obtained:
F˜2(x, z) = ∨
y∈X[F˜(x, y) ∧ F˜(y, z)]
Similarly, F˜n can be defined.
Definition 3: Assume that F˜ is the fuzzy relation on X .
If x and y are selected randomly and x, y ∈ X , then F˜ is
satisfied by the following items.
1) Reflexivity: F˜(x, x) = 1
2) Symmetry: F˜(x, y) = F˜(y, x)
3) Transitivity: F˜2(x, y) ≤ F˜(y, x)
Here, F˜ is the fuzzy relation on X, and if F˜ satisfies only
reflexivity and symmetry, then F˜ is called the fuzzy relation
on X . The corresponding matrixes are called the fuzzy equiv-
alent matrix and fuzzy similar matrix, respectively.
The corresponding features between fuzzy equivalent rela-
tions and normal relations are very useful for the applica-
tions of fuzzy clustering. On the domain of discourse D,
the equivalent classes coursed by general equivalent relations
are a type of partition of D. In other words, the domain of
discourse D can be divided into a number of non-intersecting
subsets based on the equivalent relations. Thus, any element
of D must belong to one of the subsets. This type of partition
forD, based on equivalent relations, is a clustering. However,
for fuzzy equivalent relations, the situation is more complex.
The reason is that for an arbitrary two elements u and v, we
cannot use the owner-member relationship to describe the
relation between (u, v) and F˜ . Membership degree can be
used to describe this situation. In other words, u and v have
the relation to some degree, and thus, the bound of λ is
fuzzy, and the elements of D cannot be classified based on
only F˜ . If F˜λ is the fuzzy equivalent relation, then for arbitrary
λ ∈ [0, 1], it is a normal equivalent relation. In addition,
D can be partitioned based on F˜λ, and thus, a value of F˜λ can
be obtained for a given value of λ. Different λ will generate
different, and the partitions of D are different. Therefore,
fuzzy equivalent relations can realize the partitions ofD based
on the value of F˜λ.
B. FUZZY CLUSTER ANALYSIS
The basic idea of clustering is using a scale of similarity to
measure the closeness degree, based on which classification
can be realized. The essence of fuzzy cluster analysis is
the construction of fuzzy equivalent relations based on the
attributes of the objects, which can perform classification for
the samples.
The process of clustering based on fuzzy relations is shown
as follows.
Step1: Assume the sample set X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}, where
x = {xi1, xi2, · · · , xim}, (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). The original data
of all of the indicators of xi should be standardized. Then,
appropriate formula should be used to compute the similarity
factor among all of the xi and xj, and the fuzzy relation matrix
F˜ = (fij)n×n should be established. Generally speaking, F˜ is
obtained based on the above rules and is a fuzzy similar
relation.
Step 2: The transitive closure of F˜ is denoted as t(F˜) and
should be obtained, which is the fuzzy equivalent relation
of F˜ .
Step 3: According to the requirements of the real ques-
tion, an appropriate λ ∈ [0, 1] should be chosen. Then, the
λ partition set of t(F˜), which is denoted as t(F˜)λ, should be
computed. Then, a classification result of X can be obtained.
C. MAXIMUM SPANNING TREE FOR FUZZY CLUSTERING
It is necessary to use transitive closure to realize cluster
analysis based on fuzzy equivalent relations. Here, we use
the maximum spanning tree to realize fuzzy clustering for
industrial sensing data.
Assume the sample set X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}; the fuzzy
similar matrix according to all of the indicators of xi is F˜ .
This type of cluster problem can be denoted as 〈X , F˜〉. An
empowerment complete graph corresponds to it, which can
be called a fuzzy relation graph G(X ,E, F˜), in which the
edge xixj empowers. Thus, the X clustering is the vertex set
of the vertex set of subdivision G.
Definition 4: Assume that T is a spanning tree empower-
ment connected graph. If the following formula is workable
for any spanning tree of G, then T is the maximum spanning
tree of G. ∑
e∈E(T ′)
w(e′) ≤
∑
e∈E(T )
w(e)
Definition 5: In the fuzzy relation graph G(X ,E, F˜),
(1) The minimum value of the edge weights on path L is
called the connection strength, which is denoted as S(L)
and is computed as follows.
S(L) = ∧
e∈E(L)w(e)
where E(L) denotes the edge set of path L.
(2) The maximum connection strength of all of the paths
between the two points u and v is called the connection
strength between u and v, which can be denoted as
S(u, v) and is computed as follows.
S(u, v) = k∨
i=1 S(Li), (u 6= v)
where S(u, u) = 1
(3) Assume that L is the path that connects u and v in G.
If S(L) = S(u, v), then L is the optical path that
connects u and v in G.
In addition, assume that T is a spanning tree of the fuzzy
relations graph G(X ,E, F˜); then, the following descriptions
will be workable.
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(1) T is the maximum spanning tree of G.
(2) For arbitrary e′ ∈ E(T ), T1 and T2 can be obtained
through moving e’ from T , and the following formula
is workable.
w(e′) = ∨
e∈[T1,T2]G
w(e)
(3) For arbitrary u, v ∈ X (u 6= v), then the only path
between u and v in T is the optimal (u, v) path in G.
In addition, if X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}, and the fuzzy
similar relation on X is denoted as F˜ = (fij)n×n, then
the transitive closure of the fuzzy relation F˜ is t(F˜) =
F˜n = (f nij )n×n, the corresponding fuzzy relation graph
of 〈X , F˜〉 is G = (X ,E, F˜), and the following formula is
workable:
t(F˜)(xi, xj) = f (n)ij = S(xi, xj)
Here, xi and xj can be classified into a class on λ,
which is equivalent to having a path whose strength is no
less than between vertex xi and xj in the fuzzy relations
graph G(X ,E, F˜). Therefore, the cluster can be performed
on G directly. The method is to find a path whose strength is
no less than; then, xi and xj belong to the same class on the
level of λ.
However, it is difficult to find a path whose strength is
no less than λ between two vertexes in the fuzzy relations
graph G. However, if a graph can be constructed in which
there is only one path L that connects two arbitrary vertexes
xi and xj and makes S(L) = S(xi, xj), then it is convenient to
perform clustering based on λ.
In the maximum spanning tree T in a fuzzy relations
graph G, the strength of the only path L between u and v
is S(L) = S(u, v). Thus, it is a key issue to find the maximum
spanning tree T in a fuzzy relations graph G = (X ,E, F˜).
If T has been obtained, for arbitrary λ, the disconnected sub-
graph can be obtained whose connected branches are the
classes of X on λ. The Kruskal circle method can be used to
obtain the maximum spanning tree solely based on the fuzzy
similar matrix directly without a fuzzy relations graph. The
algorithm is shown as follows.
Assume a fuzzy similar matrix and that the level of the
cluster is λ; let Bk denote the sink node set and fij = f (xi, xj).
The following is the algorithm:
(1) Select a vertex v1 ∈ X , which is denoted as B1 ∈ {v1}.
(2) Assume that v∗ ∈ C1 = X\B1, which makes f (v∗, v) =
∨
v∈C1
= (v, v1). Then, if v∗ is denoted as v2, the follow-
ing formulas are workable.
(3) Assume that k vertexes are removed (k < n). In other
words, if Bk = {v1, v2, · · · , vk} and the (k − 1)
edges of the graph is Ek−1 = {e1, e2, · · · , ek−1}, and
v∗ ∈ Ck = X\Bk make f (u∗, v∗) = ∨
u∈Bk ,v∈Ck
f (u, v);
then, v∗ is denoted as vk+1, and the following formulas
are workable.
ek =
(
u∗, vk+1
) (
u∗ ∈ Bk
)
Bk+1 = Bk ∪ {vk+1}
Ek = Ek−1 ∪ {ek}
(4) Given that k = n − 1 and the maximum spanning tree
is T . When, all of the connected branches of T after
removing all of the edges e is a class of X on λ. Then,
the algorithm is finished; otherwise, set k = k + 1 and
return (3).
D. OPTIMIZING FUZZY CLUSTERING
The comparison times of the above fuzzy clustering algorithm
are as follows:
n−1∑
k=1
[k (n− k)− 1] = 1
6
n3 + O
(
n2
)
Therefore, the complexity is O(n3).
To reduce the complexity of the algorithm, Dijkstra’s algo-
rithm can be used to follow the method in graph theory of the
valuation of the minimum spanning tree of the empowerment
connected graph. Then, the algorithm to perform the evalua-
tion of the maximum spanning tree of the fuzzy relation graph
is as follows:
(1) Select arbitrarily a vertex v1 ∈ X , and let B1 = (v1),
l(v1) = 0, l(v) := f (v1, v), and following formula is
workable.
p(v) := v1(∀v ∈ X\A), k := 1
(2) Compute max
v∈X\Ak
l(v) = l(v∗), and let Bk+1 = Bk ∪{v∗},
for every v ∈ X\Ak+1, if r(v∗) > l(v), l(v) := f (v∗, v),
p(v) := v∗.
(3) If k = n−1, according to the pointer p(·), themaximum
spanning tree T can be traced contraorbitally. Given
k = n − 1 and the maximum spanning tree T . When
w(e) < λ, all of the connected branches of T after
removing all of the edges e is a class of X on λ, and
the algorithm is finished; otherwise, let k = k + 1 and
return to step (2).
Here, steps (1) and (2) confirm the first vertex and must be
performed 2(n − k) − 1 times in comparison. Therefore, the
times of the comparisons should be performed as
(n− 2)+
n−1∑
k=2
[2 (n− k)− 1] = (n− 2) (n− 1)
Therefore, the complexity of the algorithm is O(n2).
In fact, the empowerment maximum spanning tree of the
connected graph has non-uniqueness, but this arrangement
has no impact on the connected strength between xi and xj.
In other words, the fuzzy cluster method for the maximum
spanning tree does not depend on the selection of the maxi-
mum spanning tree.
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEM AND EVALUATIONS
A. IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEM
We use multi-agents to implement the function of UCON
and chance discovery-based intrusion detection in WSNs.
Figure 7 shows the architecture of the agent system of a node
in an industrial WSN. The access flow and usage control
system component are shown in Fig. 8.
FIGURE 7. Fine-grained cross-domain usage control system.
Basically, the access control policy is to store in this com-
ponent. Additionally, the policy is aggregation as a server.
There are two sub-modules in the policymanagement module
according to the functions requirement from the core RBAC
model, the Element Sets management agent and the Relation-
ship maintenance agent.
The Element Sets management agent is a domain-based
module for element management. According to the definition
of theNational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
the basic elements include users, roles, objects, and oper-
ations. There are two classes of these elements, which are
(1) operations and objects and (2) users and roles. When the
RBAC system is applied for a resource or service, the opera-
tions and objects are relatively static. In contrast, the role set
and user set are relatively dynamic. The domain policy man-
ager is in charge of the above issues. The AddUser andDele-
teUser operations for the users provide functions for the cre-
ation and deletion of the roles. the AddRole and DeleteRole
operations for the roles have similar capabilities. The user
and role repository can store the elements set.
The relationship maintenance agent module performs three
policy assignment operations: user-to-role assignment (UA),
permission-to-role assignment (PA) and cross-domain role
mapping (RM). The scalable and dynamic benefits depend
on the domain. This module includes the AssignUser and
DeassignUser operations for UA, the GrantPermission and
RevokePermission operations for PA and the AddMapping
and DeleteMapping operations for RM.
The Context Handler Module is a component that can
translate access requests in native format with a canonical
form that is based on the standard protocol across the secu-
rity domains. In addition, this module can also translate the
authorization decisions into a canonical form.
The PDP (policy decision point) module is the decision
center of the network and can be regarded as the policy server.
The PDP stores and calls the policy in the policy manager and
makes the decisions based on the decision information; then,
it assigns the decisions to the corresponding PEP. PDP can
FIGURE 8. Access flow and usage control system components.
detect the change and conflict of the policies and implements
the corresponding actions. PDP obtains the access request
from Context Handlers and provides responses based on the
police set from the domain policy administrator.
The PEP (policy enforcement point) module is the entity
of the network that accepts the management of the policy and
can be regarded as the policy client. The PEP can be logical or
physically routed, a gateway, or other equipment of theWSN,
and it can implement the policy from the PDP. In addition,
the PEP can send a message to the PDP to enable the PDP to
know the situation of the WSN and the implementation of the
policy.
B. EVALUATIONS OF ACCESS CONTROL
In this section, we perform related simulation experiments for
evaluating the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed cross-
domain security access control scheme.
In the first simulation experiment, we evaluate the time
overhead of the security service selection according to the
increase in the number of selected services. The com-
puter platform used in the simulation includes a 2.53 GHz
Intel i5 CPU with 2GB of memory. The overhead time
is shown in Fig. 4. The proposed scheme is performed
in NetLogo [17] and obtains the service selection results,
which are inputted into Matlab to obtain visual outputs.
The number of nodes in the industrial WSNs is 200.
The related security factors, including the exploitability, cred-
ibility and severity, are from the Open-Source Vulnerability
Database (OSVDB) [18]. For each viewpoint in the horizontal
axis, such as 20 selected security services, we perform the
simulation 50 times and compute the average overhead time
as the horizontal axis.
As shown in Fig. 9, with an increase in the number of nodes
and as the domains increase, the overhead times also increase.
It is very important to evaluate the access control capabil-
ities. To evaluate the control capability, the precision rate is
defined as follows:
Pr =

SecAcc
AllAcc
, AllAcc > 0
0, AllAcc = 0
where SecAcc is the number of security accesses that were
performed based on the proposed scheme, and AllAcc is
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FIGURE 9. Response time of the access.
all of the accesses in the Industrial WSNs. Based on the
definition, Pr is satisfied with. The value of Pr denotes the
capability of the access control. The simulation results are
shown in Fig. 10.
FIGURE 10. Capability of the security access control.
C. EVALUATIONS OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS
The data cluster analysis experiment is performed on clus-
ter computers with 20 nodes, in which every server has a
2.53 GHz Intel i5 CPU and 8GB of memory. In addition, the
servers are connected based on a 1G router. Hadoop-1.0.4 is
used as the tool for the experiment. For comparisons, we
perform the data analysis experiment at 5 nodes, 10 nodes,
15 nodes, and 20 nodes. We use python script to generate
randomly the data set to simulate the sensing data in the
industrial system. The sizes of the data are 1 MB, 5 MB,
10MB, and 50MB, respectively. The overhead time of the
data analysis is shown in Fig. 11.
Figure 11 shows the overhead time of the data analysis
when the size of the data set is changed. When the size of
the data set is small, the small computer server cluster is
more efficient. However, when the size of the set increases,
a large server cluster is more efficient. This trend occurs
because when the size of the data is small, the complex-
ity of the computation is low, and it is faster to use fewer
servers. The communications overhead is too large when
large-cluster servers are used. However, when large-size data
must be analyzed, the computation overhead time from using
FIGURE 11. Time overhead of data analysis.
a single computer is large, and it is faster to use distributed
computation.
VII. RELATED STUDIES
In fact, there are many existing studies that have focused on
the area of cross-domain security. The study in [19] is based
on the basic idea of a cloud service consumption and delivery
method, and across-domain, distributed architecture scheme
was provided. Enforced traditional mandatory access con-
trol also attracted much attention, such as the Bell-LaPadula
model, which is used in [20]. In a case in which differ-
ent security domains had different owners, the data-sharing
problem can be resolved based on this work. In addition,
when the data is in a heterogeneous domain system, the work
in [21] proposed a new authenticationmodel, mainly by using
PKI technology. In a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA),
the work in [22] resolved the cross-domain authentication
problem, which used the service bus. Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) is used in [23] to perform cross-domain
access control. In the work in [24], the authors consid-
ered that designing a universal model could better satisfy
the special security requirements of military applications.
Some existing studies focus on the data usage of industrial
systems [25], [26].
Although the above existing research proposed some cross-
domain security schemes for different systems, the features
of complexity, randomness and dynamics of industrial WSNs
were not considered. In addition, an efficient mechanism that
includes cross-domain fine-grained data access control and
analysis is necessary. The results in the present paper resolve
this problem.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The openness, complexity and dynamics of WSNs increase
the risks of in industrial systems. Therefore, security is a very
important issue for this new system, and fine-grained cross-
domain security access control and efficient data analysis are
the core problems. However, there is still no efficient theory
and method to support the research in this area, and some
key scientific problems should be resolved. The complexity
and randomness from social networks raise difficulties for
assessing the security of services and discovering security
services accurately and effectively.
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This paper focused on the security of cross-domain data
usage control for WSNs in industrial systems. We first estab-
lished the trust model for Certificate Authority. Then, a login
protocol for the user and cross-domain secure authentication
protocol were proposed. Next, a fine-grained cross-domain
data usage control mechanism is proposed. Based on the
above issues, the fuzzy cluster data analysis scheme is pro-
vided. The simulation results verify the feasibility of the
overhead time and the feasibility and effectiveness of the
proposed scheme.
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